Iraq Policy Sustained by Geographical Illiteracy
This op-ed is based on material previously published in the Chicago Sun Times on March 18 and August 26, 2006.Almost no one has stopped to consider the role that geographical ignorance has played in the ongoing disaster in Iraq. Yet only a geographically illiterate public could have been hoodwinked by the characterizations of Iraq spouted in Washington after the invasion. With Iraq little more than a blank space in most people's minds, few could point to the obvious once the United States moved in: the importance of strengthening institutions such as the Iraqi army that promoted state nationalism (not recognized), the strategic advantages that could come from securing Iraq's borders against foreign intruders (not prioritized), the need to guarantee a sharing of oil revenues given the lack of significant oil fields in Sunni areas (not considered), and the value of showing that the U.S. had no long-term military designs on Iraq (not only ignored, but undercut as plans went ahead for new military bases).
The blinders that got us where we are today have not disappeared. The debate centers on what is going on inside Iraq itself. Yet what are the implications of the invasion of Iraq for the larger geopolitical picture? What impact has it had, for example, on America’s influence in Southeast Asia? What role does Iraq play in widening the geographic scope of violent extremism? The crisis inside Iraq should not distract us from the gravity of such questions. Unless they become the focus of attention, the administration can continue to claim, without challenge from significant segments of the electorate, that Iraq is at the leading edge of its "war on terrorism."
The absurdity of this claim becomes clear when one considers that the Iraq invasion has been used relentlessly and effectively by those seeking to undermine American influence in other parts of the world. Al-Qaida sympathizers from Europe have gone to Iraq, and then returned to Europe in a position to wreak more havoc than they ever could have imagined without the training Iraq had provided them. We cannot have a serious discussion of the role of Iraq in the larger terrorism picture if such matters are not part of the conversation.
A democratic society depends upon a certain level of understanding and engagement on the part of its citizens. Yet the limited exposure of most Americans to the history and geography of the Middle East means that few are in a position to question the geopolitical vision advanced by the current administration. That vision was on display when Donald Rumsfeld addressed the Senate Armed Services Committee in early August.
If we leave Iraq soon, Rumsfeld said, "the enemy would tell us to leave Afghanistan and then withdraw from the Middle East. And if we left the Middle East, they'd order us and all those who don't share their militant ideology to leave what they call the occupied Muslim lands from Spain to the Philippines."
This statement casts the Middle East as a monolithic geopolitical node. Yet watching what is happening now in Iraq shows the naiveté of that image. The issue isn’t just Shiites versus Sunnis; there are significant divisions along tribal, village, and political lines. Moreover, the perception that most of the region's states command little loyalty is manifestly wrong. In many respects state nationalism is a stronger force than Arab or Islamic nationalism. One would have to look long and hard to find animosity between two neighboring states as violent and deep-rooted as that between Iran and Iraq. Are Iranians and Iraqis really just one undifferentiated chunk of a common enemy?
In a world in which the gap between political rhetoric and reality is growing by the day, public accountability is impossible in the absence of a basic level of global understanding and inquisitiveness. There will always be differences of opinion on policy initiatives, but the Iraq venture has been conducted and promoted through a combination of on-the-ground illusions and unasked questions—all made possible by a geographically challenged general population.
The results now lie starkly before us. If we are to salvage anything reasonable from the wreckage and avoid similar policy pitfalls in the future, we can no longer let political grandstanding trump serious consideration of the cultural, political, and environmental character of the contemporary world.
Alexander B. Murphy
AAG President 2003-2004
